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The present report recommends that the United Nations (UN) 
should develop its democratic legitimacy through the creation 
of the instrument of a World Citizens’ Initiative (WCI) by which 
global citizens can place proposals on the agenda of the UN Gen-
eral Assembly or the UN Security Council. This paper makes the 
case that a WCI is legally feasible and aims to provide the impetus 
for the discussions that will lead to its establishment.
The paper offers background on the concept of citizens’ initiatives 
and discusses challenges to the formalisation of direct citizens’ 
participation in the environment of the UN. The experience of the 
European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), a European Union instrument 
that allows citizens to propose legislation to the European Com-
mission, and lessons to be learned from it are examined. A legal 
framework for the establishment of a WCI is considered in detail. 
The report recommends that the instrument of a WCI could be 
established as a subsidiary organ of the UN, under Article 22 of 
the UN Charter, if such an instrument was supported by a two-
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thirds majority of the General Assembly. This would include the 
adoption of detailed rules of procedures and the creation of a WCI 
Administrative Board.
According to this report, the functioning of a WCI would follow 
three steps: (1) Registration, (2) collection of support and (3) sub-
mission and response.
The report recommends that each WCI would be registered by an 
organising committee that consists of individuals who may not 
hold an official political office and who are not formal represen-
tatives of civil society organisations. Further, the WCI organising 
committee is to be geographically representative and its member-
ship should cover UN regions at least in the following way: five 
members from African and Asian States, one from Eastern Euro-
pean States, two from Latin American States, and two from West-
ern European and Other States.
Once established, a WCI committee would draft its proposal and 
then formally register it with the WCI Administrative Board for 
collection of support. The report suggests that only such proposals 
should be eligible that are in line with the purposes of the UN 
Charter as stated in Article 1. Within this framework, proposals 
may have a broad scope. In particular, this includes being able to 
make reform proposals or propose changes to the UN Charter. Ap-
peals against decisions of the WCI Administrative Board would be 
handled by an independent Ombudsperson.
The report recommends that a WCI would qualify for submission 
within 18 months after registration if it (1) collects the support of 
9
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at least 0.5 percent of the population of each of ten UN member 
states following the same geographical criteria as above for the 
composition of WCI organising committees and (2) if an absolute 
threshold of five million signatures is reached. According to the 
report, anybody should be able to support a WCI and robust digital 
tools should be established to facilitate the collection of support. 
Verification would be undertaken based on random samples, resi-
dency information and date of birth.
The reports envisages that a successful WCI proposal will be 
placed automatically on the agenda of the General Assembly or 
the Security Council and that it obliges either of them to draft a 
resolution in response to the proposal and then to vote on this 
resolution. It is recommended that the WCI organising commit-
tee can make representations during the debate and that states are 
obliged to publish an ‘explanation of the vote’ whether they vote in 
favour of the resolution or not, in order to provide transparency to 




In 2020 the United Nations will commemorate its 75th anniversa-
ry under the theme “The future we want, the United Nations we 
need: reaffirming our collective commitment to multilateralism”.01 
Many observers believe that the holistic and universal nature of 
the Agenda 2030 represents a global consensus on what the inter-
national community wishes to achieve within the next ten years. 
Thus, for the time being, full implementation of the Sustainable 
Development Goals could be the future we want.
The second part of the anniversary’s theme is more tricky. With re-
gards to the UN we need, a debate needs to be held. The world has 
changed significantly in the decades since the UN was established. 
It is necessary to take stock and examine what changes are re-
quired. From our point of view the UN is an indispensable centre 
for global deliberation, collaboration and action. The role of the UN 
as conscience keeper and upholder of universal norms and values 
remains steadfast. However, the notion of multilateralism needs to 
evolve beyond purely intergovernmental engagement.
12
Foreword
A commitment to multilateralism at present should acknowledge 
more than ever that the UN’s success depends on strong partner-
ships with major groups and stakeholders across the world. As the 
Earth Summit 2012 stated, sustainable development requires their 
meaningful involvement and active participation in processes that 
contribute to decision-making, planning and implementation of 
policies and programmes at all levels.02 With the present report 
we wish to go a step further. Unfortunately, there is no formal UN 
instrument to enable individual citizens to influence its work. The 
UN we need and the UN we want welcomes and seeks the input of 
“We the Peoples” in whose name it was established 75 years ago. A 
global organization that wishes to leave no one behind – as mem-
ber states pledged when they adopted the Agenda 203003 – needs 
to include everyone. In fact, the UN General Assembly has repeat-
edly stated the “right to equitable participation of all, without any 
discrimination, in domestic and global decision-making”.04
This report recommends the creation of a World Citizens’ Initiative 
to help make this happen. This instrument will enable global citi-
zens to submit proposals to the UN General Assembly or the UN 
Security Council if they manage to collect sufficient support from 
fellow citizens across the world. Similar mechanisms exist in many 
countries at the national or sub-national levels. An important ex-
ample this report draws upon is the European Citizens’ Initiative, 
the first transnational instrument of this kind, to help explain in 
detail how a World Citizens’ Initiative would function. Certainly, 
many technical details need to be discussed further and political 
will mobilized. Still, we emphasize the observation in this report 
that a World Citizens’ Initiative is feasible and that all challenges can 
be overcome in the interests of the participation of “We the Peoples.”
13
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We are convinced that the UN, member states, civil society and 
global citizens alike will benefit from the direct connection a 
World Citizens’ Initiative will establish, and that its creation will 
represent an important step forward for the UN. Clearly, a World 
Citizens’ Initiative is a proposal that is complementary to other 
ongoing efforts such as the inclusion of major groups and civil 
society in the UN’s work or the establishment of a United Nations 
Parliamentary Assembly.
The World Citizens’ Initiative is a proposal that is in line with the 
concept of people-centered multilateral cooperation in a spirit of 
global citizenship.05 It may be a key element in the long-sought re-
vitalization of the UN General Assembly. We urge representatives 
of UN member states to study this report and to launch an open and 
inclusive preparatory process for the establishment of a UN World 
Citizens’ Initiative. We invite civil society groups and individuals to 
join the international Campaign for a UN World Citizens’ Initiative 
and to provide their own comments and thoughts on the recom-
mendations and reflections put forward in this report.
On behalf of the Campaign for a UN World Citizens’ Initiative
Andreas Bummel, Executive Director,
Democracy Without Borders
Bruno Kaufmann, Board Member,
Democracy International
Lysa John, Secretary-General,
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Traditionally, discussion of democratic legitimacy and proposals 
for new forms of democracy have focussed on state or sub-state 
level governance structures. However, in the context of globalisa-
tion and increased co-operation in issues that were formerly under 
the exclusive competence of the state, international institutions 
have in recent times significantly expanded the scope of their op-
erations, taking action in response to an increasing range of global 
issues: from peace, economics and humanitarian affairs, to trade 
and environmental matters. As a result of this expansion, interna-
tional institutions increasingly exercise power in a way that has a 
significant (often negative) impact upon individuals. Manifested in 
concerns about ‘governance without government’,06 the increas-
ing normative influence of autonomous international institutions 
– from the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary 
Fund, to the United Nations in particular – has triggered a marked 
change in attitudes among states, scholars and wider civil society. 
We thus note a shift in emphasis towards the consideration of the 
question of democratic legitimacy beyond the state, and particular-
18
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ly with reference to international institutions.07 Indeed, the demo-
cratic deficit of international law and global governance has been 
called ‘one of the central questions – perhaps the central question 
– in contemporary world politics’.08 This move towards democra-
tisation of international law and global governance regimes is part 
of a so-called third democratic transformation09 and reflects the 
reduction in the autonomy of nation-states in an increasingly in-
ter-connected world.
One of the organising assumptions in this report is that the UN 
should attempt to develop its democratic legitimacy and that this 
is possible, whilst recognising that there are inherent difficulties 
in implementing democracy in a new political environment such 
as the UN. De Burca has proposed a ‘democratic striving approach’, 
which supports the presumption that international organisations 
can and should be democratically legitimised:
Although the dominant model of democracy cannot simply be 
transposed from the national domain, we can and should try to 
translate the core values of democracy into a realizable institu-
tional form when designing or reforming transnational gover-
nance practices. The democratic striving approach takes as its ini-
tial building block the principle of fullest possible participation by 
and representation of all those concerned with a commitment to 
ensuring the public-regarding nature of the process.10
The distinction between representation and participation high-
lighted by De Burca above is central to democratic debates at all 




From the representation perspective, a move towards democrati-
sation may be premised on the idea of the ‘sovereign equality of 
states’ (UN Charter, Article 2(1)). Within the plenary organ of the 
UN General Assembly, for example, each UN member state is rep-
resented, and decision-making operates through a system of ‘one 
state one vote’. This provides a degree of representative democracy 
at the international level.11 However, with this understanding of 
representation beyond the nation-state being rooted in a tradi-
tional state-centric paradigm of international law, it can only take 
the debate so far. As Peters has articulated, ‘global governance is 
transitively democratically legitimate only to the extent that in-
ternational bodies are accountable through states to citizens’.12 In 
this light, interest has turned more recently to the idea of a World 
Parliamentary Assembly, as a citizen-elected global representative 
institution,13 and participation as a means of democratising global 
governance in, for example, a global citizens assembly.14 This re-
port contributes to this debate about how we might develop the 
participation of global citizens by examining the legal feasibility of 
establishing a World Citizens’ Initiative (WCI). Democratic partici-
patory instruments of this type are used at the member state level 
in several regions of the world. The proposal is that a citizens’ ini-
tiative is adapted to the context of the UN to enable global citizens 
to launch and support policy proposals. Once organisers of a WCI 
have gathered sufficient support, the proposal would be put on the 
agenda of one of the principal political organs of the UN: the Gen-
eral Assembly or, if the initiative concerned the maintenance of 
international peace and security, the Security Council. The overall 
conclusion of the report is that the establishment of a WCI mech-
anism would be both legally feasible and politically beneficial for 
global democracy generally, and for the UN in particular.
20
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The proposal to implement a WCI is split into the following five 
sections. First, several examples are given of existing mechanisms 
for individual participation in global governance structures. Sec-
ond, some challenges to the formalisation of direct citizen partic-
ipation in UN agenda-setting are acknowledged, and some com-
ments are made about how these challenges might be qualified. 
Third, a general definition of citizens’ initiatives is provided, and 
the basis for the democratic value of a citizens’ initiative is ex-
plained. The fourth section comments on lessons to be learnt from 
the experience of the ECI. In the final section, the report offers a 
legal framework for the establishment of a WCI, which is split into 
three phases: the registration of a WCI, collecting support, and the 





participation at the 
international level
The ongoing discussions pertaining to increased participation at 
the international level have focussed on the role of civil society. 
The importance of civil society in global governance was acknowl-
edged at the ‘We the Peoples Millennium Forum of 2000’,15 and at 
the 2002 Sustainable Development Summit, in particular.16 In his 
‘Millennium Report’, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
stated that the UN:
Must be opened up further to the participation of many actors 
whose contributions are essential to managing the path of global-
ization. Depending on the issues in hand, this may include civil 
society organizations, the private sector, parliamentarians, local 
authorities, scientific associations, educational institutions and 
many others.17
Furthermore, in resolutions on the ‘[p]romotion of a democratic 
and equitable international order’, the General Assembly has re-
peatedly emphasised that achieving such an order would require 
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the realisation of the ‘right to equitable participation of all, with-
out any discrimination, in domestic and global decision-making’.18 
The expert report on the UN’s relations to civil society (Cardoso 
Report) outlined the ‘deficits of democracy in global governance’, 
and noted that ‘[o]ne of the key principles of representative de-
mocracy is connecting citizens to the decisions that affect them 
and ensuring public accountability for those decisions’.19 Impor-
tantly, the Cardoso Report specifically emphasised the potential 
role of the UN in this regard, arguing that it should be at the centre 
of any efforts to ‘reshape’ democracy to make it more relevant to 
today’s global realities and needs.20
In this light, in recent years, individuals have obtained some lim-
ited, formal participatory opportunities within global governance 
regimes. A good example is the compliance-control of the Aar-
hus Convention on environmental information. The compliance 
committee may receive communications brought forward by 
NGOs and individuals.21 Another international complaint mecha-
nism available to individuals is the World Bank Inspection Panel. 
Groups of two or more individuals who believe they have been 
negatively impacted by World Bank-financed projects can re-
quest an inspection. The Panel examines whether a failure of the 
World Bank to follow its own operational policies and procedures 
or contractual documents during the design, appraisal, or imple-
mentation of a project has adversely affected the material rights 
or interests of those persons.22 In these procedures, the individual 
petitioners also have participatory rights.23 Additionally, in inter-
national criminal proceedings before the International Criminal 
Court, victims have the right to participate in the proceedings and 
enjoy a limited right to be informed of the progress of the criminal 
25
Citizen participation at the international level
trial.24 Each of these examples envisages individuals participating 
retrospectively, as opposed to having the competence to proactive-





However, there are at least three principal challenges to imple-
menting direct citizen participation in UN policymaking. The first 
challenge is practical in nature. With a constituency of 7.7 billion 
people, it is difficult for citizens to directly influence policy agen-
das or decision-making. Traditionally, democratic theory has been 
sceptical of the possibility of large-scale democracy.25 However, de-
velopments in democratic theory, particularly in participatory and 
deliberative democratic literature, have recognised its feasibility in 
recent years. Dahl, for example, accepted the possibility of large-
scale democracy beyond the state in his later writing.26 At a practi-
cal level, the development of EU democracy has been an important 
demonstration of the possibility of reconceptualising democracy 
beyond the nation-state. Of most relevance to this report is the 
introduction of the ECI in 2012. This demonstrated the possibility 
of using participatory instruments at a supranational level and is 
an example, therefore, of how to enable citizens to influence global 
policy through the UN.
28
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The second challenge relates to the general nature of the interna-
tional legal system. States are the primary actors in international 
law.27 Individuals are still considered as ‘an object on which to be-
stow or recognize rights, not as agents from whom emanates the 
power to do such bestowing … as an object or, at best, as a consumer 
of outcomes, but not as an agent of processes’.28 Individuals cannot 
conclude treaties, and their behaviour does not constitute relevant 
practice which could lead to the formation of customary interna-
tional law. Although individuals have rights and obligations, in a 
system based on the consent and mutual reciprocity of individu-
al nation-states, there is no formal role for the individual in the 
law-making process. That said, there is some evidence to suggest 
that a broad interpretation of the right to political participation 
as guaranteed in Article 25 ICCPR might circumvent this doctri-
nal problem. The logical legal consequence of the citizens’ right to 
political participation in global governance is that individuals are 
upgraded from mere passive international legal subjects (as hold-
ers of rights and bearers of obligations) to active international legal 
subjects. The legally relevant difference is that passive subjects are 
only capable of having rights, whereas active legal subjects are ca-
pable of creating law.29 In this context, it has been argued that ‘the 
international human right to political participation includes … the 
right to contribute to the creation of international law’.30
The third challenge relates, more specifically, to the institutional 
architecture of the UN. The traditional anxiety regarding the dis-
tance between rulers and ruled is further exaggerated at the UN 
level. Notwithstanding the invocation of ‘We the Peoples of the 
United Nations’ in the preamble of the UN Charter, there remains 
no formal role for non-governmental actors of any kind in the 
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work of the primary organs of the UN. The UN is exclusively com-
posed of states and there are no bodies in which individual citi-
zens are formally represented. A common point of departure when 
thinking through these questions is Article 71 of the UN Charter.31 
Article 71 is the only provision of the Charter which applies to 
NGOs. It grants the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) the 
competence to ‘make suitable arrangements for consultation with 
non-governmental organizations’. As a result, many NGOs enjoy 
‘consultative status’ on the ECOSOC. NGOs with general consul-
tative status,32 and NGOs with special consultative status,33 may 
propose items for the Council’s provisional agenda,34 their repre-
sentatives may attend public meetings of the ECOSOC Commis-
sion and its subsidiary organs as observers,35 and they may submit 
written statements.36 NGOs listed on the Roster, who make ‘occa-
sional … contributions to the work of the Council or its subsidiary 
bodies or other UN bodies within their competence’, may also ful-
fil these functions when matters being discussed fall within their 
field of competence, and upon the recommendation of the Secre-
tary-General and at the request of the Commission may be heard 
by the Commission.37 It is important to note, however, that even 
under this regime NGOs do not enjoy equal standing with states. 
The right of consultation does not amount to a right of partici-
pation. Instead, it is directed towards assisting ECOSOC to fulfil 
its mandate.38 It is also confined, of course, to the areas of compe-
tence covered by ECOSOC’s mandate. That said, the fact that the 
Charter itself acknowledges the possibility of entities other than 
states enjoying a formally recognised status in the UN provides a 
springboard to consider how this might apply in other contexts.

31
The democratic value 
of citizens’ initiatives
Democracy at its core is based on popular sovereignty and politi-
cal equality. This is the belief that all people affected by decisions 
should have an equal and effective opportunity to influence them. 
What this means in practice and how we recognise when these 
principles are sufficiently met is the subject of much debate. The 
democratic criteria of Robert Dahl underpin the analysis in this 
report.39 He established five democratic criteria ‘from within the 
enormous and often impenetrable thicket of ideas about democ-
racy’: effective participation, voting equality, gaining enlightened 
understanding, exercising final control over the agenda, and the 
inclusion of adults.40 These characteristics are the democratic at-
tributes that need to be in place for the members of a political 
system to be politically equal in determining the policies of the 
association. The introduction of the WCI aims to strengthen the 
extent to which the UN meets some of these criteria and enhance 
its democratic legitimacy.
Democratic instruments such as the WCI are the institutionalisa-
32
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tion of participatory democracy and therefore, by definition, relate 
to increased and more effective participation. This, in turn, is ex-
pected to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of a polity or an 
international organisation such as the UN.41 For this participation 
to be meaningful though, it also needs to tangibly influence policy 
decisions. This means that analysis of a citizens’ initiative focuses 
on Dahls’ criteria of inclusion, effective participation and exercis-
ing final control over the agenda. These fall into two categories 
in terms of their specific relevance to an evaluation of the imple-
mentation of a World Citizens’ Initiative: inclusion and process, 
and impact.42 Inclusion addresses the question of who participates; 
process the question of how citizens participate; and impact the 
question of what happens after citizens participate.43
Inclusion and process are linked because they both focus on the 
effectiveness of the participation opportunity that the WCI gives 
to citizens. Having an inclusive opportunity for all citizens to en-
gage in institutional decision-making that affects them has long 
been an essential criterion for democracy, and this requirement 
of inclusion is important in all concepts of democracy, even elitist 
ones.44 The WCI needs to increase the number and range of citizen 
voices directly heard in UN decision-making to increase UN dem-
ocratic legitimacy. To maximise this, the design of the WCI should 
ensure that all citizens are able to use it to place issues on the UN 
political agenda in an equal and inclusive manner. In other words, 
no citizens should be excluded directly or indirectly from using 
the WCI, and all citizens should be treated equally when they try 
to organise or support a WCI. This is a significant challenge when 
trying to develop democracy on a global scale. Effective partici-
pation also means that the burden and barriers in terms of pro-
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cedural complexity and resources that it imposes on citizens, as 
both organisers and supporters, such as funding, time, numerical 
thresholds etc., are kept to a minimum. The design of the WCI 
must minimise any restrictions it places on citizens’ ability to take 
up this democratic opportunity.45
A citizens’ initiative is a form of direct democracy that enables 
citizens to influence political decision-making, through placing 
an issue on the political agenda and triggering an institution-
al response, once a defined level of support has been reached.46 
Broadly speaking, there are two categories of citizens’ initiatives.47 
Full-scale citizens’ initiatives oblige a political institution to act,48 
often by holding a public vote, such as in Switzerland and Califor-
nia. The more common agenda-setting citizens’ initiatives place an 
issue on the agenda of a sitting political body, usually the parlia-
ment of a state, but leave the final decision about how to respond 
to that institution.49 The expectation is that the WCI will be an 
agenda-setting initiative because of the non-binding nature of the 
decisions of the UN General Assembly,50 as is reflected in the repe-
tition of the word recommendation in Articles 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 
of the UN Charter. The significance of an agenda-setting initiative 
is not therefore in the obligation to initiate a legal process, but in 
the political influence that citizens can exert through the citizen’ 
initiative process.
The two elements of impact are: influencing the political agenda 
and influencing the subsequent decision-making. The first element 
relates to ensuring that citizens can use the WCI to place items 
on the UN agenda for discussion. Without this opportunity, the 
WCI would be a token gesture controlled by the institutions that 
34
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control the agenda. In the case of the UN, the WCI would need 
to influence the agenda of the General Assembly or the Security 
Council. The second aspect, if an instrument such as the WCI is to 
strongly influence the UN’s democratic legitimacy, is for participa-
tion through the WCI to have an influence over UN resolutions.
In the next section, the report focuses on the experience of the 
ECI. The report then concludes with an analysis of the three key 
stages of a citizens’ initiative campaign, and the design features in 
them, such as the support threshold and the obligation that a WCI 
imposes. The analysis of citizens’ initiatives that is presented and 
the proposals made for the implementation of a WCI are based 
on the principles outlined above; namely that citizen participation 
using the WCI should be inclusive, minimise barriers to participa-
tion, and should have an impact on the UN’s political agenda and 






Citizens’ initiatives are well-established as state-level democratic 
instruments,51 but the only transnational application is the ECI, 
which is a major democratic innovation introduced following the 
EU’s Lisbon Treaty in 2008. It acts as an example for all transna-
tional organisations struggling with criticisms of their democrat-
ic legitimacy. The ECI provides the closest applicable example for 
introducing a citizens’ initiative into the UN governance structure 
and is evidence that a WCI reporting to the UN could succeed.
The potential significance of the ECI for EU democratic legitimacy 
is widely recognised,52 and, upon its inception, the European Com-
mission believed that it would be ‘a significant step forward in 
the democratic life of the Union’ and add a ‘whole new dimension 
of participatory democracy’.53 These high expectations have only 
been partly met, however, and there have been challenges to over-
come. For example, the Commission initially took a cautious ap-
proach to ECI proposals that limited the numbers of ECIs,54 there 
have been administrative and practical barriers to overcome,55 and 
38
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campaigners are concerned about the impact of successful ECIs.56 
Despite these challenges, the dozens of ECIs launched have mo-
bilised millions of citizens and ECI proposals have influenced EU 
policy-making. The ECI, therefore, provides a positive basis on 
which to propose a World Citizens Initiative. In the same way that 
the idea of a World Parliamentary Assembly can draw some inspi-
ration and best practice from regional parliamentary bodies,57 the 
WCI can draw on the experience of the ECI.
The ECI is an example of an agenda-setting initiative that invites, 
rather than obliges, the European Commission to propose an EU 
legal act. The ECI has had an influence on political debate and the 
policy agenda, but it has had a limited concrete impact on EU law 
or policy. In other words, the ECI is closer to being an instrument 
of incumbent rather than critical democracy that can challenge 
policy to some degree, but its impact remains controlled by the ex-
isting institutions.58 Expectations would have to also be carefully 
managed in relation to the WCI because the WCI legal framework, 
as is the case for the ECI, would oblige a formal response from 
the UN institutions, but would not oblige the UN to pass a resolu-
tion on the WCI proposal. Ultimately, the final decision as to what 
political impact a successful WCI could have rests with the UN 
members states. The impact of the WCI, therefore, would largely 
depend on the political influence that it could bring to bear rather 
than its legal strength.
The ECI regulations and process set the context for discussion of 
a WCI. Art 11(4) Treaty of European Union establishes the Euro-
pean Citizens Initiative as an opportunity for citizens to invite the 
Commission to make a proposal for a legal act:
39
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Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a signifi-
cant number of member states may take the initiative of inviting 
the European Commission, within the framework of its powers, to 
submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens con-
sider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of 
implementing the Treaties.59
The phrases highlighted above in Art 11(4) establish the treaty ba-
sis for the support thresholds, the ECI’s strength of legal obliga-
tion, and the limits on the subject matter of the ECI.60 These are 
the key characteristics that define the scope and type of citizens’ 
initiative for the ECI.61 A successful ECI needs support from 1 mil-
lion citizens from across the EU, it can invite but not oblige the 
Commission to start the legislative process, and an ECI propos-
al can relate to any EU competence where citizens think reform 
is needed.62 The WCI design also needs to consider these issues 
raised by the text highlighted in Art 11(4) TEU. A decision needs 
to be taken about the number of citizens and states that represent 
a level of legitimacy that can trigger a response from the UN Gen-
eral Assembly or Security Council; what response is obliged from 
these bodies; and what proposals are appropriate for a WCI. Art 
11(4) was implemented by Regulation 211/2011, which defined 
these characteristics in more detail,63 and established the ECI pro-
cess.64 The report discusses below how this translates to a WCI 
process whose proposals would be presented to the UN, and in 







Step 1: Establishing a citizens’ initiative
The Committee
The first formal step for a citizens’ initiative is to establish an or-
ganising committee that will take responsibility for the citizens’ 
initiative process. This committee is formed for two broad purpos-
es: planning and leading the campaign for the collection of support 
for the citizens’ initiative proposal, and the dissemination of the 
ideas within the proposal. As the European Parliament stated in 
relation to requiring the establishment of a committee for each 
ECI: the committee is ‘to encourage the emergence of Europe-
an-wide issues and to foster reflection on those issues’.65 The WCI 
committee would, similarly, be tasked with ensuring that the pro-
posal reaches a global audience.
Secondly, the committee is responsible for ensuring the initiative 
follows procedures appropriately. An understanding and imple-
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mentation of the relevant legal framework and funding transpar-
ency are needed during the life of a citizens’ initiative campaign. As 
the European Parliament stated: the nomination of a lead person 
from the committee is “for the sake of transparency and smooth 
and efficient communication”.66 Similarly, a WCI would need a lead 
contact for liaison with the UN.
The WCI committee members would serve as the data controllers 
of the information collected within the statements of support giv-
en by citizens, and therefore they are legally responsible for the se-
curity of the data. Committee members are also responsible for the 
publication of information about any funding received to ensure 
transparency of the supporters of an initiative. These legal require-
ments could be problematic for a WCI that has a global reach and 
operates within many different legal jurisdictions. One possibility 
is that the UN itself takes on responsibility for these issues as far 
possible – for example by providing the IT infrastructure for stor-
ing information and agreeing on a legal jurisdiction under which 
this is held. The WCI could also allow organising committees to 
have a legal personality to reduce liability issues.
An ancillary purpose of the WCI committee is to increase the ex-
tent to which a proposal starts with wide geographical support. The 
ECI requires the formation of an organising committee of at least 
7 EU citizens, resident in 7 different member states, prior to the 
application to register an ECI. To increase the extent to which the 
WCI reflects the interests of a global audience, it is recommended 
that the composition of the organising committees for WCIs con-
tain at least 10 people. The composition of the committee should 
comply with the principle of ‘equitable geographical distribution’ 
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set out in Article 23(1) of the Charter. General Assembly Resolu-
tion 1991 (XVIII), adopted in 1963, formally apportions non-per-
manent seats on the Security Council, for example, according to 
a specific geographical ‘pattern’. The geographical pattern set out 
in the resolution, and which WCI organising committees should 
reflect, is as follows:
 (a) five African and Asian States;
 (b) one Eastern European States;
 (c) two Latin American States;
 (d) two Western European and Other States.67
In order to ensure genuine geographical representation, the sce-
nario whereby the committee is made up of representatives of five 
Asian states, or five African states, with no representation from 
the other region, should be avoided. The only minor change to the 
pattern that is recommended, therefore, is that there should be an 
explicit requirement that three Asian states are represented, and 
two African states. Considering the rationale underpinning the 
establishment of a WCI, that is, enhanced citizen participation, the 
considerably larger population of Asian states compared to Afri-
can states should be acknowledged.
It is also recommended that the organising committee is made up 
of ‘natural persons’. In other words, the members of the commit-
tee cannot be politicians or formal representatives of civil society 
organisations. This would serve to increase the WCI’s status as an 
initiative for citizens and not corporate or political interests and 
reduce the chance of lobby capture. However, in practice, given the 
global reach of a WCI and the resource requirements this implies, 
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it is likely that civil society organisations will play a central role in 
the WCI campaigns, as they do for the ECI.
Initiative Registration
Having established a committee, the WCI organisers need to draft 
their proposal and then register it for collection of support. The 
amount and type of information that organisers need to submit 
at registration vary greatly between citizens’ initiatives. Clarity 
is important so that citizens and the UN institutions understand 
the proposal, but excessive requirements will act as a barrier to 
participation. The ECI takes a relatively light-touch approach, only 
requiring the title of the ECI and a brief explanation of its sub-
ject matter and aims. The authors recommend that WCI proposals 
should be more detailed and presented as a draft General Assembly 
or Security Council resolution, depending on which body’s com-
petence the proposal falls under. This will provide clarity in terms 
of the proposal and increase the certainty in terms of the expected 
outcome of a WCI process that has to reach a global audience, but 
it is worth noting that this could mean that WCI organisers need 
to seek legal advice to help write the draft resolution.
The next step in a citizens’ initiative process is the formal registra-
tion of the initiative. At this point, there will typically be an eligibil-
ity check to make sure the citizens’ initiative proposal meets certain 
criteria. Usually, these will require that the proposal is appropriate 
and within the powers of the institution that will receive a success-
ful citizens’ initiative proposal. The review of citizens’ initiative pro-
posals at registration though should not excessively limit the public 
discourse a citizens’ initiative proposal can develop. On the other 
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hand, it is important that organisers of a citizens’ initiative are clear 
from the outset whether their proposal could have the desired im-
pact, and whether legally the institution receiving the citizens’ ini-
tiative proposal can make the policy change requested.
The eligibility check for the ECI has four criteria: 1 – forming the 
committee, 2 – the proposal in the ECI must not be ‘manifestly 
outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to propose a 
legal act’, 3 – the ECI is not manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexa-
tious, and 4 – is not manifestly contrary to the values of the Union. 
This report recommends that the UN establish a similar registra-
tion process that ensures a WCI proposal meets the procedural 
requirements, is within the competence of the UN, and fits within 
the principles of the UN.
The most controversial registration criteria for the ECI is point 2. 
The hybrid supranational/intergovernmental nature of the EU and 
the fact that EU laws are directly applicable in its member states 
means this question of competence creep is a particular concern 
for the EU’s member states. The Commission was over-zealous in 
guarding against this problem in the early years of the ECI.68 They 
refused to register a high percentage of ECIs through an overly strict 
registration review of proposals that decided they were outside the 
powers of the Commission. The competences of the UN General 
Assembly, however, are not legally binding on the member state so 
this question of citizen participation increasing the control of the 
supranational organisation over the member states should be less 
of an issue for a citizens’ initiative presented to the UN. The com-
petences of the UN General Assembly are also very wide-reaching, 
and so the competence check at registration should be straightfor-
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ward assuming that WCI proposals are welcome on all issues that 
are within the competence of the UN General Assembly.
One important decision taken by the UN committee at registration 
is whether the WCI falls within the competence of the UN General 
Assembly or the UN Security Council. The process for proposals 
that are within the competence of either body is the same up to the 
point of presentation of a successful WCI. The obligation imposed 
on the Security Council and the General Assembly after that differ 
and are discussed in section 4 below.
The other criteria for ECI registration have not led to any ECIs be-
ing refused registration and should not raise any issues for a WCI. 
The forming of the committee is a simple procedural check. The 
experience of the ECI indicates that the question of whether a WCI 
proposal is malicious, frivolous or vexatious is likely to only arise 
on very rare occasions. The administrative organ of the UN would 
need to make a judgment on those occasions. In order to make this 
judgment, the organ should be driven, first and foremost, by the 
purposes of the UN Charter as stated in Article 1. It is logical that 
the registration criteria should mirror the founding purposes of 
the organisation that will receive the proposal. Article 1(3) which 
emphasises the importance of ‘promoting and encouraging respect 
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion’, will be particular-
ly relevant. The fundamental principles of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights may also be taken into consideration at this 
point. Only those proposed initiatives that would manifestly run 
contrary to the purposes of the UN would not meet this criteri-
on. For these reasons, the registration of a WCI is unlikely to be a 
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burdensome process for the UN administration or for organisers. 
This is beneficial in democratic terms because it allows a wider 
range of issues to be debated publicly and placed on the political 
agenda, and means there is a low barrier to entry for starting the 
democratic process. This sort of ‘light-touch’ registration approach 
is also easier to justify for an agenda-setting initiative such as the 
WCI that has little legal obligation built-in because there is little 
risk to the overall political environment or to fundamental rights.
In short, the lower the barriers at registration, the more citizens 
will use the WCI and the more impact it is likely to have on the 
democratic legitimacy of the UN through increasing inclusivity 
and citizen influence over and decision-making
One final substantive question is whether a WCI should be able 
to advance reform proposals or charter changes. Using the ECI to 
propose a fundamental change to the EU treaties is a controversial 
question and one that is not clearly resolved by the law establish-
ing the ECI in Art 11(4). On the one hand, it is argued that an ECI 
is unlikely to ever have the level of support that would legitimise a 
request to change fundamental law and that it is the states that are 
members of the EU and responsible for initiating change to the EU 
treaties. On the other hand, it is argued that the ECI process en-
dows a right on citizens through their EU citizenship, rather than 
their member state citizenship, and so citizens should be entitled 
to use the ECI to propose a change to all EU laws, including the 
treaties themselves. Also, to exclude proposals that require trea-
ty change is to exclude some of the most important EU political 
issues from the scope of the ECI, which substantially limits the 
democratic value of this instrument. Moreover, the fact that the 
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ECI obliges just a political response to a proposal and is only an 
agenda-setting instrument means that it would only have an im-
pact on the treaties where the other EU institutions agreed with 
the proposal. The recommendation is therefore that the WCI has 
a broad scope that includes being able to make reform proposals 
or propose changes to the UN charter. Given the controversy this 
issue is likely to raise, the WCI framework should make it clear 
that this is possible.
Registration Administration
The WCI implies administrative discretion, requires policy over-
sight of the WCI implementation, and the process itself requires 
administrative oversight. For example, an entity would be required 
to ensure that WCI registration decisions meet the required crite-
ria (see discussion above), and later in the process, verification of 
signatures. The WCI will, therefore, necessitate the establishment 
of a new organ of the UN. For ease, the new organ will be referred 
to as the ‘WCI Administrative Board’.
Of course, the Board could be established through a treaty between 
member states of the UN. The treaty would set out an explicit in-
stitutional relationship with the General Assembly, but the organ 
would not be categorised as a subsidiary organ. Another option is 
that the General Committee administers the process. The Gener-
al Committee is a microcosm of the General Assembly, to which 
the President of the General Assembly, the twenty-one Vice-Presi-
dents of the General Assembly, as well as the chairpersons of each 
of the six main committees, belong.69 The General Committee is 
responsible for organising the work of the session and for recom-
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mending to the General Assembly the scheduling and handling of 
each item on the agenda. For this option, the General Assembly 
would have to amend its Rules of Procedure to establish a WCI 
instrument and provisions for its management.
A third option, which the authors recommend, is the establish-
ment of the WCI Administrative Board as a new organ with sole 
competency in this area. Article 7(2) of the Charter generally pro-
vides for the establishment of subsidiary organs by the principal 
organs of the United Nations. Under Article 22 of the UN Charter, 
‘the General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it 
deems necessary for the performance of its functions’. The deci-
sion to establish a subsidiary organ may be viewed as an ‘import-
ant decision’, per Article 18(2). If this was the case, it would require 
a two-thirds majority rather than a simple majority. However, it 
is debatable whether this would be required. In most cases, the 
General Assembly requires consensus and a roll-call vote does not 
tend to be taken. However, considering the democratic role of the 
WCI, our recommendation would be that the original founding act 
of establishing the WCI Administrative Board have this minimal-
ist requirement of democratic legitimacy. 
Subsidiary organs are essentially characterised by three features, 
which speak to only a limited autonomy:
 1 . Subsidiary organs are created by a principal organ of the UN;
 2 . the membership, structure and terms of the subsidiary organ are 
determined and modified by the principal organ;
 3 . subsidiary organs may be terminated or suspended by a principal 
organ .70
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However, the subsidiary organ would necessarily possess a certain 
degree of independence, since otherwise, the entity would simply 
be a part of the principal organ.71 In this light, Szasz identifies a 
category of ‘quasi-autonomous bodies’.72 The WCI Administrative 
Board might potentially be best viewed in this light. It is import-
ant that the Board maintains a degree of independence from the 
very institution that WCI’s will be established to influence.
In general, the initiative for establishing subsidiary organs comes 
from the General Assembly itself. Interestingly though, the Gen-
eral Assembly has also founded subsidiary organs on the recom-
mendation of international conferences. For example, the United 
Nations Environment Programme was initiated by a recommen-
dation of the Conference on the Human Environment in Stock-
holm in 1972. NGOs played a pivotal role in the drafting of the 
Stockholm Declaration and the Action Plan for Human Environ-
ment which were instrumental in lobbying the General Assembly 
to act. The World Food Council was also established in 1974 by 
the General Assembly on the recommendation of the World Food 
Conference.73
Although negative registration decisions are likely to be rare, 
there may still be times when WCI organisers may want to appeal 
against registration decisions. The ECI registration appeals go to 
the Court of Justice of the EU.74 There is no comparable primary or-
gan in the UN, so an independent adjudicatory process would need 
to be set up. Our recommendation is to establish an independent 
Ombudsperson office, similar to the UN Office of the Ombudsper-
son, which was established in 2009 to mitigate unfairness to indi-
viduals in UN Security Council sanctions decision-making.75 The 
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Ombudsperson is not an adjudicatory process but instead fulfils 
a fact-finding inquisitorial role that examines maladministration. 
Upon receipt of a request of delisting, the Ombudsperson engages 
in a four-month period of information gathering. At the end of 
this process, the Ombudsperson prepares a report outlining the 
information she has received and lays out the main arguments re-
lating to the request. If the Ombudsperson recommends delisting, 
the individual will be removed from the list unless, within sixty 
days, the Sanctions Committee decides to maintain the listing. The 
Committee is obliged to give reasons for rejecting the request.76 
A similar process that focuses on administrative issues, such as 
the duty to give reasons, could be followed in relation to appeals 
against WCI registration decisions.
Step 2: Collecting support
Once registered, a citizens’ initiative can start the process of col-
lecting support for its proposal. ECI organisers have 18 months 
to collect the requisite level of support. The organisers inform the 
Commission of the start date, which must be within 3 months of 
the ECI registration decision.77
Support threshold
The support threshold is the most complicated aspect of this phase 
of a citizens’ initiative. The success threshold for a citizens’ initia-
tive is the point at which the political body has decided that the 
proposal has the legitimacy to influence their decision-making. 
The higher the level of support required, the more legitimate it 
is for a citizens’ initiative to have an impact on decision-making. 
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If set too low, the legitimacy of a citizens’ initiative proposal will 
be limited and reduce the chance that unwilling political actors 
will respond to a proposal that is put to them, even if it meets the 
threshold. However, the higher the threshold is set and the more 
complicating factors that are included, the more it will act as a 
barrier and reduce the likelihood of the WCI being used.
The degree of obligation that a citizens’ initiative can impose in-
fluences the threshold decisions. In general, the stronger the obli-
gation that a citizens’ initiative imposes, the higher the threshold 
for support. Higher support and greater legitimacy are needed to 
oblige a political institution to act. For example, in Hungary, there 
are three levels at which an initiative obliges action: an agenda 
initiative needs 50,000 signatures; at 100,000 signatures Parlia-
ment has to decide whether a binding or an advisory referendum 
is held; 200,000 signatures are required to initiate an obligatory 
and binding referendum.78 As the WCI is a form of agenda-setting 
initiative, the threshold requirements at which a WCI would be 
submitted to the UN General Assembly or Security Council can be 
set relatively low.
The threshold also reflects the level of difficulty for organisers to 
collect the support needed. The ECI has to collect support from 
a relatively low percentage of the population when compared to 
national citizens’ initiatives. This reflects, in part, the large geo-
graphical area that organisers need to reach. This issue would also 
arise for the WCI, and so setting a relatively low support threshold 
will be needed to avoid a prohibitively high level of difficulty for 
WCI organisers.
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The threshold requirements must also reflect the sources of legitimacy 
for the political institution that a proposal is seeking to influence. The 
ECI threshold, for example, balances member state legitimacy with 
the supranational legitimacy of the number of citizens and reflects 
the fact that the EU is a hybrid intergovernmental/supranational pol-
ity. For national citizens’ initiatives, the threshold is usually just an 
absolute number of national citizens, which reflects the nation-state 
as a single sovereign entity. This is not the case for the UN. As the UN 
is an intergovernmental organisation, the WCI would need to reflect 
support from a certain number of member states, perhaps also re-
gions, to be legitimate. Setting a level of member state and regional 
support will also avoid WCI proposals coming from a relatively small 
geographical area. Again, though, if this number is too high, then it 
will become too difficult to collect support and the WCI will not be 
used. In part, this could be mitigated by setting a longer time period 
for collecting support. This report recommends that a WCI be given 
18 months to try to collect the necessary level of support. Although 
this is still a challenging timeframe, any longer and the topicality and 
legitimacy of a proposal is reduced.
This report recommends that we use the same criteria as for the 
composition of the WCI organising committee to ensure geo-
graphical representativeness. We recommend that a WCI be pre-
sented to the UN when it has sufficient support from citizens from 
at least the following:
 (a) five African and Asian States;
 (b) one Eastern European State;
 (c) two Latin American States;
 (d) two Western European and Other States .79
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This is the same as the pattern used for forming the organising 
committee. For a state to be quorate and count towards the WCI 
threshold, this report recommends that the WCI needs support 
from 0.5% of the population of that state. This places a WCI to-
wards the lower end of national initiatives in terms of the per-
centage of support needed for a national citizens’ initiative. The 
overall percentage of the world population supporting a WCI will 
be much lower than this, and lower than the 0.2% of the total 
EU population that the ECI needs. This approach treats all states 
equally. The ECI takes a different approach. It uses a sliding scale 
that means smaller states need a higher percentage of the popula-
tion to be quorate in support of an ECI proposal than larger mem-
ber states. This scale is based on the allocation of MEPs. The aim 
is to balance the influence of population size against influence as a 
member state through smaller states getting proportionately more 
MEPs than larger states. The ECI sliding scale reduces the tempta-
tion to seek support just from smaller member states. However, we 
do not recommend a sliding scale for the WCI because there is no 
pre-existing agreement to base the scale on, and more importantly, 
the UN works on a ‘one state - one vote’ principle in the General 
Assembly. A sliding scale of population support for states to be 
quorate for a WCI would run counter to this.
This report also recommends that an absolute level of support is 
required before a WCI proposal is presented to the UN. The UN 
does not need the transnational legitimacy that an absolute fig-
ure bestows for it to act, and there is no UN citizenship. However, 
the need for an absolute figure takes the WCI beyond the confines 
of the intergovernmental framing of the UN and its member state 
focus, and still confers extra legitimacy. It also helps maintain a 
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balance between the value of larger and smaller states to the col-
lection process... This report, therefore, recommends that a WCI 
get support from 5 million people before it can be presented to the 
UN institutions.
The European Parliament recognised the practical difficulties and 
potential costs of reaching the support thresholds for an ECI in a 
polity such as the EU and proposed a number of mitigating mea-
sures.80 To this end, they requested the provision by the Com-
mission of an online system for the collection of signatures,81 a 
comprehensive user guide and a help desk for providing advice.82 
An EU data server and translation services have also been made 
available to organisers. It is suggested that the UN should establish 
a body to support citizens wishing to use the WCI process and 
help mitigate what can be a costly process with these types of ser-
vices and initiatives. This body will need to offer the same level of 
support that ECI organisers are offered, and make sure that there 
is the highest level of data security for information collected from 
supporters of a WCI. Although a paper collection process should 
still be available, the online collection system is even more import-
ant for a global campaign to collect support for a WCI proposal and 
therefore warrants a high level of support.
Support Eligibility
 
Anybody should be able to support a WCI. For other citizens’ ini-
tiatives, there is a political boundary that usually limits those who 
can support a proposal either based on residency or on citizenship. 
The UN has no such political boundary. The question is then how to 
identify the person supporting a WCI proposal. The ECI experience 
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has highlighted the impact that excessive identity requirements 
can have on reducing the likelihood that someone will support a 
proposal.83 This has led to a simplification of the identification re-
quirements in the new ECI regulation that encourages residency 
as the basis for identification rather than identity documents that 
vary from state to state. The recommendation, therefore, would be 
that someone wishing to support a WCI should only be required 
to provide residency information and date of birth. This also sim-
plifies the process to verify the support for WCI proposals, which 
the UN would need to establish. The most straightforward and 
proportionate process would be to verify a random sample of state-
ments of support for a WCI proposal to make sure that they are real 
people and genuine supporters of the WCI proposal. The WCI pro-
cess will also need digital tools to ensure that robots and multiple 
registrations cannot corrupt the collection of support. The UN will 
also need to decide whether verification is carried out by each state 
where citizens that support a proposal are resident, or whether they 
centralise the verification of support into a UN body.
Step 3: Submission and response
The final phase for a successful citizens’ initiative is the submis-
sion of the proposal to a decision-making body. When designing 
a citizens’ initiative this decision about the obligation that it im-
poses is key. One of the defining features of a citizens’ initiative 
is that it imposes an obligation on a political body – otherwise 
it is merely a petition. The degree and type of obligation though 
vary significantly. In Finland, it obliges the Parliament to debate a 
proposal and make a legislative recommendation. In Switzerland, 
a citizens’ initiative can oblige holding a referendum.
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The ECI just obliges the Commission to explain its decision to act or 
not. This has led to something of an expectation gap between ECI 
campaigners and the Commission, with campaigners wanting full 
implementation of their proposals, and the Commission expecting 
a compromise with existing policy positions. The Water Directive 
was the first piece of EU legislation influenced by a successful ECI; 
the Right to Water ECI.84 The Right to Water Campaigners though 
were hoping for further impact from their campaign. The ‘One of 
Us’ ECI campaign has gone as far as to ask for judicial review of the 
Commission’s response to their ECI, which collected over two mil-
lion signatures.85 Without policy impact, there will be little incen-
tive to use the WCI, but the expectations of campaigners also need 
to be managed to avoid disappointment with policy outcomes at 
the end of the political process and to avoid challenges to follow-up 
decisions. The proposals below try to strike this balance between 
political discretion and campaigner expectations.
WCI proposal within the
competenceof General Assembly
For all matters other than international peace and security, the 
General Assembly is the most appropriate forum to discuss a WCI 
proposal. If the underlying rationale is to influence the political 
agenda and to encourage states to support a proposal, the General 
Assembly would be an ideal forum. The Assembly is ‘essentially a 
debating chamber, a forum for the exchange of ideas and the dis-
cussion of a wide-ranging category of problems’.86
There are three options for placing a WCI proposal on the General 
Assembly agenda: 
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First, the WCI may be added to the agenda to be discussed at the 
initial general debate of each annual session while heads of state 
and government are present. This would require the organising 
committee to meet the required timescales and to comply with 
the procedures of the General Committee, the body responsible 
for setting the agenda. 
Second, a WCI initiative might trigger a ‘special session’ of the Gen-
eral Assembly which can be called by the Secretary-General at the 
request of the Security Council or a majority of member states.87
Third, it may be that instead of a plenary debate, it would be preferable 
for the WCI proposal to be discussed in one of the six main com-
mittees that cover: disarmament and international security, economic 
and financial, social, humanitarian and cultural, special political and 
decolonisation; administrative and budgetary; and legal matters.
Further to this, this report recommends that a WCI obliges the 
UN, either the General Assembly or the Security Council, to draft 
a resolution in response to the proposal and then to vote on the 
resolution.
The action that a citizens’ initiative can force also depends, of 
course, on the powers of the political body that it addresses. The 
UN General Assembly has the power to pass resolutions that mem-
ber states are expected to respond to, but are not legally binding. It 
is itself a form of agenda-setting body. It is not a legislative or the 
executive body in the mould of a state. However, the General As-
sembly is in a position to launch intergovernmental negotiations 
under the auspices of the UN on new treaties or to put questions 
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in front of the International Law Commission for further consid-
eration, to name two relevant ways of taking action.
Furthermore, to organise a World citizens’ initiative is a major un-
dertaking. The effort that a successful citizens’ initiative requires 
from citizens is an important consideration when deciding what 
obligation a citizens’ initiative should impose on a political body. 
If there is a very little meaningful impact from a citizens’ initiative 
then citizens are unlikely to use the instrument. This is particu-
larly true for a global citizens’ initiative that requires organisation 
across the world.
Excessive obligation from a citizens’ initiative runs the risk of le-
gitimacy issues. This is because a successful WCI will still only 
have a relatively small percentage of citizens that support a pro-
posal. This is one of the reasons that states, such as Switzerland, 
hold a referendum after a citizens’ initiative. A referendum pro-
vides a mandate from the whole population. The UN could take 
another approach to try to address this issue of legitimacy and 
complement the intergovernmental legitimacy for a WCI proposal 
from the UN process. The aim would be to gain further transna-
tional legitimacy. Two possibilities are to establish a World Parlia-
mentary Assembly that would debate WCI proposals or to form a 
global citizens’ assembly.
The authors envisage that a WCI proposal will be placed automat-
ically on the agenda of the General Assembly. It should be noted 
that this bypasses the traditional route through the General Com-
mittee, which decides upon the agenda for each upcoming session 
on an annual basis. A WCI proposal that is successful would be 
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presented to fall in line with this annual agenda-setting process. 
This would require the organising committee to meet the required 
timescales and to comply with the procedures of the General 
Committee, the body responsible for setting the agenda.
It is recommended that the WCI organising committee can be rep-
resented, and make representations during the debate. Of course, 
the ultimate vote on whether the resolution should be adopted 
will be made by states. It would not be prudent to suggest a fun-
damental restructuring of the voting system of the General As-
sembly. The authors would recommend, however, that states are 
obliged to publish an ‘explanation of the vote’ in order to provide 
transparency to the WCI organisation committee.
WCI proposal within the competence
of the Security Council
If the subject matter of the initiative related to the maintenance of 
international peace and security, the proposal would be submitted 
to the UN Security Council. The Security Council has ‘primary re-
sponsibility for the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity’.88 In carrying out this responsibility, member states agree that 
the Council is acting on their behalf. The potential value in submit-
ting the proposal to the Security Council would be that decisions 
of the Council are, contrary to recommendations of the General 
Assembly, binding on all states in the international community.89 
The potential challenge, however, is that the capacity to impose 
binding enforcement measures is predicated on a determination 
by the Council that the situation in question constitutes either a 
‘threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an act of aggression’.90 It 
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is commonly accepted that this determination is a political ques-
tion, and not easily subjected to objective legal criteria. It is also 
accepted that it is the Security Council, and the Council only, that 
is competent to make this decision. Representatives of the WCI 
organising committee may participate in the Security Council de-
bates preceding this decision, however, they would not be permit-
ted voting rights. The rules of procedure currently already allow 
for the participation of “specially affected” non-Council member 
states.91 The WCI organising committee might, in this light, be 
seen as a ‘specialised agency’ along the lines of the relationship 
between non-governmental organisations and the Economic and 
Social Council. Support for this suggestion can be found in Ar-
ticle 70, which provides the ‘arrangements for representatives of 
the specialized agencies to participate, without vote, in its delib-
erations’. In short, a successful WCI would oblige the Council to 
discuss its proposal, but it would not translate into an obligation 
to take definitive action. If the Council determines that a WCI does 







This report proposes a major evolution for transnational democ-
racy: the introduction of a World Citizens’ Initiative that will give 
global citizens the opportunity to directly influence UN policy-
making. This report discusses some of the key considerations for 
those tasked with framing a World Citizen’s Initiative. These are 
the registration criteria and scope of a WCI, the thresholds that 
need to be reached for a WCI to oblige a response from the UN, 
the principal technical requirements relating to the collection 
and verification of support, and the impact that a successful WCI 
should have. Also included are recommendations for some of the 
most important design decisions, and indicates some of the fur-
ther tasks for the UN to establish a WCI. Although this report has 
focussed on the most important aspects of WCI, a number of oth-
er questions will, of course, arise when the details of WCI design 
are tackled, not least because of political considerations that are 
outside the scope of a legalistic report such as this one. Neverthe-
less, this report has shown that a WCI is feasible and will hope-
fully provide the impetus for the discussions that might lead to 
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its establishment. Such a move would complement other existing 
mechanisms to enhance democratisation of global governance re-






At the launch of the Campaign for a UN World Citizens‘ Initiative 
on 14 November 2019 civil society organizations and individual 
citizens were invited to sign the following statement. To support 
the statement and to see a current list of endorsements visit the 




It’s time to give citizens a voice at the UN
The biggest challenges facing us such as climate change, violent 
conflict and inequality are global and cross cutting in nature. They 
need collective responses from the international community. The 
UN is the key arena to make this happen.
As the UN celebrates its 75th anniversary, it’s time to give people a 
direct voice in its affairs. The UN’s legitimacy, relevance and ability 
to tackle contemporary challenges can be enhanced by making it 
more open and accessible to ordinary citizens.
As global citizens and as representatives of civil society from around 
the world, we urge the UN to establish the instrument of a World Citi-
zens’ Initiative which will enable citizens to put forward proposals on 
key issues of global concern for discussion and further action at the 
highest political level. The UN should put any matter that reaches a 
certain threshold of support from people onto the agenda of the open-
ing debate of each annual session of the General Assembly.
We firmly believe that the addition of the new instrument of a 
World Citizens’ Initiative will enhance the agency of citizens all 
over the globe, empowering them, the UN and its member states 
alike to tackle global challenges in our increasingly complex and 
interconnected world more effectively.
The time has come to give a voice to citizens of the world and re-
alize the promise of the Preamble of the UN Charter which begins 
with the words, “We the Peoples of the United Nations”.
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Humanity is faced with global challenges that require collective 
global responses. The United Nations is the key arena to make this 
happen. This report recommends that the UN should strengthen 
its democratic legitimacy and its connection to global citizens 
by enabling them to put proposals on the UN‘s agenda if they 
mobilize sufficient support from across the world. The instrument 
to implement this idea is a World Citizens‘ Initiative. This legal 
study explores in detail how this could work. The time has come 
to realize the promise of the UN Charter which begins with the 
words,  “We the Peoples of the United Nations”.
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